The 3rd Battalion, after several days in reserve with the First Armored Division, was committed with the British First (Guards) Division in the Carreceto sector. German artillery fire in this area was unusually intense and it was here that the enemy launched his main drive to push the beachhead into the sea. After one of the heaviest artillery barrages ever experienced by 504 men, the Germans began their attack in the early hours of February 5, 1944. On successive days British units were cut off from the 3rd Battalion, which was forced to withdraw to the famous "factory" in Mussolini's wonder-town of Aprilia. Enemy railroad guns and dive bombers then concentrated their efforts on the 3rd Battalion garrison. The paratroopers suffered severe casualties, and by the time enemy infantry moved in, the companies had been reduced in strength to between 20 and 30 men.

Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in which the paratroopers by sheer determination and courage, were able to repel repeated German onslaughts. Rather than remain in the exposed positions in which they now found themselves, they withdrew to a railroad underpass several hundred yards behind the "factory" and established defensive positions. H Company was ordered to attack and attempt the rescue of a British general who had been captured. After bloody fighting, they recaptured the general, only to find themselves cut off from friendly forces. I Company was then ordered to attack and make contact with H Company. The 16 men remaining in the company carried out this mission successfully and a semblance of order was restored to this sector - the backbone of the German attack had been broken. It was for this outstanding performance in the period 8-12 February, that the 3rd Battalion was given one of the first Presidential Citations in the European Theater of Operations.

The remainder of the Combat Team, meanwhile, had been engaged in heavy fighting in the Third Division sector. On January 30, the 1st and 2nd Battalions jumped off in an attack that was to take them to the Cisterna River. The 1st Battalion led the way and encountered only light resistance as they passed through the German outpost line. Soon after, however, as they neared their first bridge objective over the Mussolini Canal, they were engaged by strong enemy forces. The reserve company was committed and the enemy driven back across the stream, first blowing the bridge behind him and thus saving the paratroopers the trouble.

While the 1st Battalion was consolidating its gains, the 2nd Battalion advanced along the left flank of the 1st Battalion and under similar circumstances, were engaged by the enemy in the vicinity of a bridge farther upstream. Here again, the enemy was forced to retreat across the canal after blowing the bridge behind them. The 2nd Battalion continued the attack to the North on the heels of the retreating Germans, who proceeded to blow another bridge - this time it was the bridge crossing the Cisterna River. The loss of this bridge denied the paratroopers any further support from friendly tanks, a factor which caused the 2nd Battalion to halt its advance and dig in on the far side of the river.

Much enemy material in the form of halftracks, 75mm howitzers, small arms, and vehicles was either captured or destroyed in this attack. Eighty prisoners were taken with very heavy casualties inflicted upon the enemy. 504 losses were comparatively light.

For the remainder of their eight-week stay on the Anzio beachhead, 504 men found themselves confronted with a defensive situation, rather than offensive for which they had been trained. With the exception of the first week of fighting on the beachhead, no appreciable advance was made by our forces. It was strictly trench-type warfare characteristic of the First World War. For the first time, 504 men were digging dugouts and living in them for weeks at a time; barbed wire entanglements and mine fields in unusual depth covered all areas where the enemy might conceivably tread; alternate positions were prepared for any eventuality, and there were times when such an eventuality did not seem too remote. All in all, this was not the type of combat for which the 504 was psychologically suited. In fact, it was absolutely contrary to the way that paratroopers had always been taught to fight, and so it was with something more than the usual enthusiasm that the men of the 504 received the order to embark from Anzio on March 23, for the trip to Naples.

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